Hungarian cases before ICSID tribunals: the Hungarian experience with investment arbitration by Nagy, Csongor István
Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 58, No 3, pp. 291–310 (2017)
DOI: 10.1556/2052.2017.58.3.4
2498-5473 / USD 20.00
© 2017 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
Hungarian cases before ICSID tribunals:  
the Hungarian experience with investment arbitration
Csongor István nagy*
Abstract. The paper presents, in an analytical manner, Hungary’s legal experiences with international investment 
arbitration, giving an in-depth overview of the country’s ICSID cases and their background. Investment disputes 
are notoriously complex and have several political, economic and regulatory aspects. The purpose of the paper is 
to present the Hungarian investment disputes in the context of their local background and the national regulatory 
environment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Central and Eastern Europe is considered to be the litmus paper of investment arbitration in 
Europe. Central European countries are popular targets of investment disputes: the 
overwhelming majority of the cases against EU Member States are proceedings launched 
against countries from the region. Arguably, these countries may be characterized by 
intensive intervention in the market, the state’s strong regulatory role and the entrenched 
social status of public services, which, by their nature, may interfere with the economic 
interests of foreign investors. In these procedures, arbitral tribunals judge measures that are 
part of the core of national regulatory sovereignty, such as national privatizations, protection 
of public health, regulation of prices and curbing of monopolies, and the exercise of 
contractual rights.1 Hungarian investment arbitration cases are no exception to these 
experiences.
This paper endeavors to present, in an analytical manner, the legal aspects of the 
Hungarian experience with international investment arbitration, providing an in-depth 
overview of the country’s ICSID cases and their background. Investment disputes are 
notoriously complex and carry several political, economic and regulatory aspects, this is 
why this paper depicts the selected Hungarian investment disputes in the context of their 
local background and national regulatory environment.
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2. BUDAPEST AIRPORT:  
COMPENSATION FOR ILLEGAL EXPROPRIATION
The fact pattern of ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. 
Republic of Hungary2 centered around a blatant expropriation: Hungary, through a 
legislative act, eliminated the claimants’ right to operate two terminals of the Airport of 
Budapest. This matter is one of the very rare cases where the tribunal pronounced the taking 
unlawful and, instead of the ‘market value plus interest’ test, it applied the in integrum 
restitutio standard.3
In 1995, the claimants, two Cypriot enterprises, entered into a contract with the 
Hungarian Air Traffic and Airport Administration (ATAA, a Hungarian state agency), 
whereby they agreed to renovate Terminal 2A and to construct Terminal 2B of the Budapest-
Ferihegy International Airport (currently: ‘Budapest Ferenc Liszt International Airport’) 
and to participate in their operation. They finished the construction and operation works in 
1998 and operated the two terminals until the end of 2001, when their rights related to 
operation were abolished through a legislative act. The Air Traffic Act (Act XCVII of 1995) 
was amended late 2001 (through Act CIX of 2001) and the minister of transport and water 
management issued a decree (Decree 45 of 2001) under the authority of the new provisions 
of the amended act, Section 1(5) of which appointed a public limited company, Budapest 
Ferihegy Nemzetközi Repülőtér Rt. as the Airport’s exclusive operator.
The tribunal found the expropriation unlawful because Hungary failed to name a 
legitimate (and credible) public interest goal, the taking was discriminatory and due process 
was not observed, as well as just compensation was not provided.4
The illegality of the expropriation changed the standard on the calculation of quantum. 
Under the applicable BIT, in case of lawful expropriation, the compensation equaled the 
market value at the time of expropriation plus interests.5 However, since the taking was 
considered to be unlawful, this standard could not be applied. Although there was ‘general 
authority for the view that a BIT can be considered as a lex specialis whose provisions will 
prevail over rules of customary international law’, as the BIT concluded by Cyprus and 
Hungary contained no provision as to damages to be paid in case of unlawful expropriation,6 
the tribunal (in the absence of any lex specialis) applied ‘the default standard contained in 
customary international law’,7 which was mainly based on Chorzów Factory (Claim for 
Indemnity) (Merits), Germany v. Poland, P.C.I.J. Series A., No. 17 (1928).8 According to 
this, the injured party is entitled to in integrum restitutio – the plight that existed prior to the 
illegal act (expropriation) has to be restored; that is, the injured party has to be brought into 
the situation that would have existed should the illegal act has not occurred.
2 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16.
3 On the conditions of lawful taking see Víg and Doklestic (2015). On compensation theories in 
international investment protection law see Víg and Gajinov (2016) 447–61.
4 Award (2 October 2006), paras 426–44.
5 Para 482. Article 4(2) of the Cypriot-Hungarian BIT provided that ‘[t]he amount of 
compensation must correspond to the market value of the expropriated investments at the moment of 
the expropriation.’
6 Para 481.
7 Para 483.
8 Para 480. & 499.
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Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had 
not been committed.9
Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the 
value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss 
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it.10
Hence, the relevant point of time (as regards the market value) was not the moment of 
expropriation but the time when the award was rendered. Hungary had to compensate the 
claimants for ‘all unpaid dividends and management fees from the date of expropriation 
until the date of the award’.11 As the value of the Airport (more precisely that of the right to 
operate it) increased considerably, the difference in the calculation standard entailed a 
significantly higher quantum.
3. UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
In Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. the Republic of Hungary,12 the claimant claimed 
damages for expropriation and failure to accord fair and equitable treatment and protection 
for its investment.13 Telenor was the sole owner of Pannon (one of the three mobile service 
providers in Hungary at that time), whereas 75% of the shares in the claimant were owned 
by the state of Norway).14
Pannon obtained a concession in 1993 (for which it paid certain fees: concession fee, 
frequency allocation fee, frequency usage fee).15 Afterwards, influenced by EU electronic 
communications legislation (although at that time Hungary was not part of the EU yet), 
Hungary introduced the concept of universal service in the regulatory regime of the 
telecommunications market: consumers were afforded the right to a particular set of 
electronic communications services, irrespective of geographic location and economic 
considerations.16 The provision of universal service was limited to fixed-line operators; 
Hungary entrusted the fixed-line operators with the provision of the universal service and 
established a funding mechanism to compensate the universal service providers for the 
unrecovered costs incurred: it created the Universal Telecommunications Support Fund 
(ETTA) and obliged all, mobile and fixed telecommunications service providers to 
contribute a portion of their revenue to the fund. Likewise, Hungary introduced regulated 
prices for mobile service providers with significant market power (SMP), establishing 
regulated prices regarding interconnection (call termination) services.17 Furthermore, the 
  9 Permanent Court of International Justice, Factory at Chorzów, Judgment No. 13, 13 
September 1928, Series A, No. 17, p. 47.
10 Permanent Court of International Justice, Factory at Chorzów, Judgment No. 13, 13 
September 1928, Series A, No. 17, p. 47.
11 Para 518.
12 ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15 (September 13, 2006).
13 Award (13 September 2006), para 17.
14 Para 16.
15 Para 29.
16 As to the regulatory concept of universal service see Nagy (2013) 1731–56.
17 Paras 23–24.
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Hungarian Competition Office imposed a fine on Pannon for abuse of its dominant position 
(the review of the HCO’s decision was pending when the statement of claim was filed).
Telenor based its case on four grounds: first, since mobile service providers could not 
be appointed as universal service providers, Pannon was deprived of business opportunities; 
second, it had to contribute to the ETTA, although the fund was distributed among fixed-
line universal service providers only; third, it was designated as a service provider with 
SMP and, hence, was subjected to regulated prices; fourth, it was imposed a competition 
fine.18
The tribunal found that no expropriation occurred:19 it concluded ‘that Telenor has 
failed to make out a prima facie case of expropriation’ and, hence, it had no jurisdiction for 
claims for expropriation.20
The tribunal held that although the concept of expropriation encompasses also indirect 
or creeping nationalization,21 ‘the mere exercise by government of regulatory powers that 
create impediments to business or entail the payment of taxes or other levies does not in 
itself constitute expropriation.’
64. (…) Any investor entering into a concession agreement must be aware that 
investment involves risks and that in some degree the investor’s activities are likely to 
be regulated and payments made for which the investor will not receive compensating 
advantages. These are all part of the price the investor has to pay for securing the 
concession. Similarly, unreasonable behaviour on the part of officials and breaches of 
contract, even if serious, do not by themselves constitute acts of expropriation. The 
conduct complained of must be such as to have a major adverse impact on the 
economic value of the investment.
65. There has been a substantial volume of case law, both under the Washington 
Convention and in general public international law, as to the magnitude of the 
interference with the investor’s property or economic rights necessary to constitute 
expropriation. Though different tribunals have formulated the test in different ways, 
they are all agreed that the interference with the investor’s rights must be such as 
substantially to deprive the investor of the economic value, use or enjoyment of its 
investment.
(…)
66. There have also been arbitral awards suggesting that deprivation of a substantial or 
significant part of the economic value of the investment may suffice to constitute 
expropriation. (…) However, these suggestions have typically been made in cases 
where the question of partial deprivation did not arise on the facts, and were no doubt 
designed to avoid excluding the possibility that partial deprivation might in an 
appropriate case constitute expropriation. (…)
67. The Tribunal considers that, in the present case at least, the investment must be 
viewed as a whole and that the test the Tribunal has to apply is whether, viewed as a 
whole, the investment has suffered substantial erosion of value.
18 Para 35.
19 Para 79.
20 Para 80.
21 Para 63.
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Specifically as to the ETTA and the contribution to the universal service fund, the 
tribunal established that these were ‘similar to measures introduced in other jurisdictions, 
all mobile service providers were excluded, not only the Pannon, and the contribution was 
not discriminatory, applied to all service providers’.22
Telenor’s claims concerning fair and equitable treatment wrecked on issues of 
jurisdiction. Namely, the applicable BIT’s dispute settlement clause subjected only 
expropriation claims to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, while complaints as to fair and equitable 
treatment were not covered. The claimant argued that the tribunal should still have 
jurisdiction, due to the BIT’s MFN clause: if Hungary stipulated the ICSID in any of its 
BITs also as to fair and equitable treatment cases, this extended jurisdiction shall be 
applicable also to investors from Norway. The tribunal rejected this interpretation of the 
relevant BIT and established that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim as to fair and 
equitable treatment.23
4. REJECTION TO RENEW THE NATION-WIDE RADIO FREQUENCIES
In Accession Mezzanine Capital L.P. and Danubius Kereskedőház Vagyonkezelő Zrt. v. 
Hungary24 and in Emmis International Holding, B.V., Emmis Radio Operating, B.V., and 
MEM Magyar Electronic Media Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. v. Hungary,25 the legal 
dispute centered around Hungary’s rejection to renew nationwide radio-broadcasting FM 
frequencies. The cases concerned Hungary’s most popular radio stations: Danubius radio 
was shut down after 23 years of operation, whereas Sláger radio had a history of 11 years 
when its frequency license expired.
In Accession Mezzanine Capital L.P. and Danubius Kereskedőház Vagyonkezelő Zrt. v. 
Hungary, the two claimants (Mezzanine, a company organized under the laws of Bermuda 
and DSHV, a company organized and existing under the laws of Hungary) alleged that 
Hungary unlawfully expropriated – without compensation and without complying with 
other standards of treatment (set forth in the applicable BIT, customary international law 
and applicable law) – the claimants’ investments in and related to Danubius Rádió 
Műsorszolgáltató Zrt. (Danubius Radio) and its operating activities.
Danubius Radio was a former licensee of one of the two nationwide FM radio-
broadcasting frequencies in Hungary; first it obtained the frequency license in 1997 for a 
period of seven years, after participating in an international call for tender of the licenses; in 
2004 the license was renewed for a period of additional five years. In 2009, Hungary’s 
National Radio and Television Broadcasting Board published a call for tender for the 
issuance of frequency licenses; Danubius Radio’s application was declared unsuccessful 
and it was not awarded a new frequency license.26 Claimants contended that the 
expropriation and inappropriate treatment resulted from Hungary’s decision to carry out a 
tender procedure which replaced Danubius Radio with another licensee, notwithstanding 
the fact that Danubius Radio had successfully operated the radio-broadcasting frequency 
concerned for more than twelve years.27
22 Para 78.
23 Paras 91–95, 97 and 101.
24 ICSID Case No. ARB/12/3.
25 ICSID Case No. ARB/12/2.
26 Decision on Respondent’s objection under Arbitration Rule 41(5), para 31.
27 Decision on Respondent’s objection under Arbitration Rule 41(5), para 30.
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Since the claimants’ case related to alleged expropriation appeared to be particularly 
weak, it was crucial for the claimants to have Hungary’s conduct assessed under non-
expropriation treatment standards (such as fair and equitable treatment, prohibition of 
unreasonable and discriminatory measures).28 However, this raised serious issues of 
jurisdiction. Although the applicable BIT did contain provisions which could have been 
relied upon for this purpose (i.e., Article 3 contained ‘National Treatment and Most-
Favoured-Nation Provisions’, while Article 11 provided that ‘[i]f the provisions of law of 
either Contracting Party or obligations under international law existing at present or 
established hereafter between the Contracting Parties (…) contain rules (…) entitling 
investments by investors of the other Contracting Party to a treatment more favorable than 
is provided for by the (…) [BIT]’, such rules prevailed to the extent they were more 
favorable), Article 8, referring exclusively to Article 6 of the BIT, confined the jurisdiction 
of the ICSID to expropriation claims.
To bring also non-expropriation claims into the ambit of the legal dispute, the claimants 
argued that, notwithstanding the BIT’s dispute settlement clause, as the ICSID Convention 
mandates the tribunal to apply also international law, the tribunal had the power to 
adjudicate all claims emerging from international law as such. Notably, the issue of 
applicable law is governed by Article 42 of the ICSID Convention, which, in turn, in the 
absence of party choice, provides for the application of the law of the host state ‘and such 
rules of international law as may be applicable’.
The tribunal held that albeit the interpretation and application of the BIT were, indeed, 
governed by international law and the concept of expropriation could not be interpreted 
‘without considering customary and general principles of international law, as well as any 
other sources of international law in this area’,29 there is no basis ‘to expand the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction beyond expropriation and attendant rules of international law’; hence, any 
international law rules applied by the tribunal would be confined to expropriation.30 The 
tribunal held that customary international law was not ‘a distinct and separate basis of 
potential liability in this case’ (since the tribunal’s jurisdiction did not extend to such legal 
bases); customary international law simply intertwined with expropriation law.31
Similarly, the tribunal also established that the MFN clause did not create a new legal 
basis coming under the tribunal’s jurisdiction: ‘MFN clauses are not and should not be 
28 ‘36. Claimants further contend that the measures summarized above constitute further 
violations of Hungary’s obligations under the BIT (as well as the provisions of the treaties with other 
States that are incorporated by the most-favored-nation principle of Article 3 of the BIT), including, 
without limitation, the obligation to (i) observe obligations attendant upon a direct or indirect 
expropriation of an investment; (ii) ensure and afford fair and equitable treatment to investments; (iii) 
avoid impairing by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the operation, management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment or disposal of investments; (iv) not engage in nationality discrimination against 
Claimants and in favor of Hungarian nationals in the award of radio-broadcasting licenses; and (v) 
observe obligations entered into with regard to investments.
37. In addition, Claimants contend that Respondent’s measures as described above violate their 
obligations under customary international law, including (i) the breach of the international minimum 
standard of treatment of foreign investors, and (ii) expropriation without compensation of Claimant’s 
investments without observance of due process and payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation equal to the fair market value of the investments.’
29 Decision on Respondent’s objection under Arbitration Rule 41(5), para 67.
30 Decision on Respondent’s objection under Arbitration Rule 41(5), para 70.
31 Decision on Respondent’s objection under Arbitration Rule 41(5), para 72.
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interpreted or applied to create new causes of action beyond those to which consent to 
arbitrate has been given by the Parties’.32 The MFN clauses can be relied on only to the 
extent they are connected to arbitration.
74. The Tribunal is of the view that an investor may properly rely only on rights set 
forth in the basic treaty, meaning the BIT to which the investor’s home state and the 
host state of the investment are directly parties, but not more than that. The question 
should be whether the rights and benefits sought by virtue of the MFN clause are 
included within the arbitrable scope of the basic treaty. In the instant case, the arbitrable 
scope of the basic treaty is expropriation, including fact and law questions related 
thereto. In that light, Claimants are entitled to rely on the MFN provisions of the BIT, 
but only insofar as such provisions relate to expropriation.
In Emmis International Holding, B.V., Emmis Radio Operating, B.V., and MEM 
Magyar Electronic Media Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. v. Hungary,33 the tribunal went 
through a similar line of analysis, as its jurisdiction was similarly limited to expropriation 
claims. At the end, the tribunal declined jurisdiction as to the ‘treatment’ claims and rejected 
the expropriation claim as unfounded.
255. In the final analysis, the Tribunal is satisfied that the only proprietary right that 
Claimants had, capable of protection from expropriation, was the Broadcasting Right it 
acquired in 1997. That right was a right of limited duration. It expired on 18 Novem-
ber 2009. None of the ways in Claimants have sought to plead their case on the 
injustices that they allege were perpetrated upon them in the 2009 Tender meet the 
basic requirement of a property right. This being so, the Contracting States to the 
instruments of consent, namely the Netherlands and Switzerland BITs, have not 
conferred upon this Tribunal jurisdiction to determine Claimants’ claims on the merits. 
Accordingly this Tribunal has no option but to dismiss Claimants’ claims of 
expropriation as presently maintained in this arbitration for lack of jurisdiction.
5. REGULATING PRICES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
In AES Summit Generation Limited, AES-Tisza Erőmű Kft. v. Hungary,34 the claimants sued 
under the Energy Charter Treaty because Hungary, after abolishing regulated prices as of 
1 January 2004, reintroduced them in 2006 and 2007. AES Summit, seated in the UK, 
owned 99% of the shares in AES-Tisza, a company incorporated under the laws of Hungary. 
AES Summit purchased AES-Tisza (at that time Tiszai Erőmű Részvénytársaság) and 
agreed to pursue and complete a retrofit of all four units of the power plant and also to 
construct a new power plant at Borsod. At the same time, Hungary was obliged to extend 
the long-term power purchase agreement (PPA) with AES-Tisza and to conclude one with 
the power plant at Borsod (since at the relevant time the Hungarian energy market was not 
liberalized, the state – more precisely MVM, the state-owned Hungarian Electricity 
32 Decision on Respondent’s objection under Arbitration Rule 41(5), para 73.
33 Award of the Tribunal (16 April 2014)
34 ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22 (June 29, 2012). It is worthy of note that this was not the first 
investment dispute between the claimant and Hungary. AES Summit Generation Limited sued 
Hungary also in 2001 in Case ARB/01/4. However, this controversy ended in a settlement.
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Company – was the only buyer of electricity from the power plant). Although the PPA did 
contain a pricing formula, the prices charged by AES-Tisza to MVM entailed a general 
outcry, resulting in regulatory intervention in the form of regulated prices.
AES Summit and AES-Tisza claimed that their investment was expropriated due to the 
reintroduction of the regulated prices and also raised complaints under the ECT’s ‘treatment’ 
provisions, such as fair and equitable treatment, prohibition of discrimination.
The claim as to expropriation was summarily rejected. The tribunal grasped the 
investment as one unit and refused to treat each element of the investment as an 
independently protectable investment. As a corollary, it held that Hungary did not take 
control over the investment and though the regulated prices decreased profitability they did 
not deprive the investment of its value.
14.3.1 It is evident that many state’s acts or measures can affect investments and a 
modification to an existing law or regulation is probably one of the most common of 
such acts or measures. Nevertheless, a state’s act that has a negative effect on an 
investment cannot automatically be considered an expropriation. For an expropriation 
to occur, it is necessary for the investor to be deprived, in whole or significant part, of 
the property or effective control of its investment: or for its investment to be deprived, 
in whole or significant part, of its value.
14.3.2 But, in this case, the amendment of the 2001 Electricity Act and the issuance of 
the Price Decrees did not interfere with the ownership or use of Claimants’ property. 
Claimants retained at all times the control of the AES Tisza II plant, thus there was no 
deprivation of Claimants’ ownership or control of their investment.
14.3.3 Moreover, Claimants continued to receive substantial revenues from their 
investments during 2006 and 2007, which proves that the value of their investment 
was not substantially diminished and that they were not deprived of the whole or a 
significant part of the value of their investments.
14.3.4 In these circumstances, the Tribunal concludes that the effects of the 
reintroduction of the Price Decrees do not amount to an expropriation of Claimants’ 
investment(s).
The tribunal also rejected the claimants’ arguments as to fair and equitable treatment, 
unreasonableness and discrimination.
First, the claimants complained that Hungary frustrated their legitimate expectations 
through reintroducing regulated prices and thus failed to provide fair and equitable 
treatment. The tribunal established that ‘legitimate expectations can only be created at the 
moment of the investment’,35 though it admitted that it is uncertain whether this covers the 
time when the investment was decided or when it was made or both.36 In this case, the 
investment could be regarded as having been decided and made in 1996, when AES Summit 
took over AES-Tisza and/or in 2001, when AES Tisza was retrofitting the Tisza II power 
station.37 The tribunal found that at the time of the take-over AES Summit could have no 
legitimate expectations as to the fact, motivation and methodology of the regulation or non-
regulation of prices, since both the privatization materials and the relevant investment 
35 Award (23 September 2010), para 9.3.8.
36 Para 9.3.12.
37 Para 9.3.12.
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agreements ‘were explicit that Hungary would continue to set maximum administrative 
prices for electricity sales indefinitely into the future’.38 As far as the investments made as 
from 2001 are concerned, the tribunal concluded that ‘Hungary made no representations/
gave no assurances of a nature that go to the heart of claimants’ complaint – i.e., that 
following the termination of price administration on 31 December 2003, regulated pricing 
would not again be introduced’.39 It is noteworthy that Hungary, as the single buyer of 
electricity at that time, regulated the contractual relationship between itself and AES-Tisza 
through a legislative act (decree). Albeit Hungary did not promise that prices would not be 
regulated, it could have been argued that the investor when concluding a private contract 
with a Hungarian public enterprise (MVM), which was the only potential buyer of 
electricity, could have legitimately expected Hungary not to interfere with this private 
contract through legislative means, except there was an indication to the contrary. However, 
the tribunal came to the opposite conclusion: if there was no specific promise not to regulate 
prices, the investor could not legitimately expect Hungary not to do so. Thus, the tribunal 
established that the claimants’ legitimate expectations were not frustrated.40 Likewise, the 
tribunal rejected the claims relating to the stable legal and business framework.41 As to due 
process, arbitrariness and transparency, the tribunal established that not all imperfections 
amount to a failure to provide fair and equitable treatment. ‘The standard is not one of 
perfection. It is only when a state’s acts or procedural omissions are, on the facts and in the 
context before the adjudicator, manifestly unfair or unreasonable’.42 The tribunal concluded 
that Hungary’s ‘process of introducing the Price Decrees, while sub-optimal, did not fall 
outside the acceptable range of legislative and regulatory behavior’.43
Second, the tribunal also dismissed the claim that Hungary impaired the investment by 
unreasonable and discriminatory measures, using a fairly deferential standard. It inquired 
separately whether a rational policy (that is, public policy end) existed and whether 
Hungary’s conduct could be considered reasonable in relation to that policy.44
As to the definition of the public policy, the tribunal afforded Hungary a very wide 
margin of appreciation: ‘[a] rational policy is taken by a state following a logical (good 
sense) explanation and with the aim of addressing a public interest matter’.45 From the three 
reasons listed by Hungary, the tribunal rejected the first two but accepted the third one.
Hungary alleged that it was concerned that generators would not agree to any 
reductions in electricity capacity in their contracts with the Hungarian national electricity 
enterprise. The tribunal found that states cannot use legislative power to compel private 
parties to give up their valid contractual rights.
10.3.12 As to this point, the Tribunal finds that it cannot be considered a reasonable 
measure for a state to use its governmental powers to force a private party to change or 
give up its contractual rights. If the state has the conviction that its contractual 
obligations to its investors should no longer be observed (even if it is a commercial 
38 Para 9.3.15.
39 Para 9.3.18.
40 Para 9.3.26.
41 Paras 9.3.27., 9.3.31–32. & 9.3.35.
42 Para 9.3.40.
43 Para 9.3.73.
44 Para 10.3.7.
45 Para 10.3.8.
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contract, which is the case), the state would have to end such contracts and assume the 
contractual consequences of such early termination.
Furthermore, the tribunal also rejected Hungary’s argument that regulatory intervention 
was motivated by EU state aid concerns: the tribunal noted that ‘as long as the Commission’s 
state aid decision was not issued, Hungary had no legal obligation to act in accordance with 
what it believed could be the result of the decision and to start a limitation of potential state 
aid’.46 As to this point, it is to be noted that Hungary’s obligation as a Member State to 
refrain from providing illegal state aid stems directly from EU law; that is, this is an 
obligation that stands by virtue of the law and not as a consequence of the Commission’s 
decision; the latter only pronounces an existing obligation. Therefor it was found 
unreasonable to expect a Member State to await the Commission’s final decision, if the 
concerns under EU state aid law were genuine.
The tribunal endorsed Hungary’s third argument and by this it looks as if it sanctioned 
something it had rejected when dismissing the first public interest explanation. Hungary’s 
third argument was that power plants (including AES-Tisza) were afforded excessively high 
profits under the PPAs concluded with MVM and this resulted in higher burdens for 
consumers.47 The tribunal considered this goal to be reasonable and legitimate.
10.3.34 Having concluded that Hungary was principally motivated by the politics 
surrounding so-called luxury profits, the Tribunal nevertheless is of the view that it is a 
perfectly valid and rational policy objective for a government to address luxury profits. 
And while such price regimes may not be seen as desirable in certain quarters, this 
does not mean that such a policy is irrational. One need only recall recent wide-spread 
concerns about the profitability level of banks to understand that so-called excessive 
profits may well give rise to legitimate reasons for governments to regulate or re-
regulate.
While it is true that the price-regulation governed all transactions, it cannot be 
disregarded that at the relevant time MVM, which was controlled by the state and, as such, 
acted as the long-arm of the state, was in a dominant position regarding the purchasing of 
electricity, buying the vast majority of the electricity produced in Hungary.
The tribunal also established that Hungary’s acts could be considered reasonable in 
relation to that policy.48 The price regulation was reasonable, proportionate and consistent 
with the public policy pursued,49 it ensured the claimants a reasonable return50 and was not 
discriminatory, the price established for each power plant was established on the basis of 
the same methodology,51 and it breached neither the requirement of national treatment,52 
nor the principle of most favored nation treatment.53
46 Para 10.3.16.
47 Paras 10.3.20., 10.3.23–24., 10.3.31.
48 Para 10.3.7.
49 Para 10.3.36.
50 Paras 10.3.37. & 10.3.44.
51 Paras 10.3.45. & 10.3.47.
52 Paras 11.3.2. & 11.3.3.
53 Paras 12.3.2. & 12.3.3.
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6. TERMINATION OF LONG-TERM ELECTRICITY POWER PURCHASE 
AGREEMENTS COMPELLED BY EU STATE AID LAW
Interesting cases emerged from Hungary’s termination of the long-term electricity power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) that raised novel questions of interpretation. Hungary (as the 
facts of AES Summit demonstrate) privatized its power plants in the mid ‘90s. The main 
reason behind was that the infrastructure and facilities were outdated and needed retrofitting 
for which Hungary wanted to attract foreign investors. According to the privatization 
agreements, various investors purchased the power plants and entered into contractual 
obligations to retrofit; however, at that time, the Hungarian electricity market was not 
liberalized, and MVM was an unavoidable contracting partner for the power plants, hence 
the investors needed a guarantee that they would recover on their investments. For this 
reason, in parallel to the privatization contracts, they also entered into long-term power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) with MVM that the latter would purchase, the electricity they 
produced at a given price. However, after Hungary’s accession to the EU, the European 
Commission established that these PPAs contained veiled state aid, as the price paid by 
MVM exceeded the market price.
Two investment disputes were launched after the termination of the PPAs. While the 
ICSID tribunal decided for Hungary in Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary,54 in EDF 
International S.A. v. Republic of Hungary55 the claimant (in an ad-hoc arbitration proceeding 
conducted under the UNCITRAL rules, in which the award is not publicly available) was 
awarded € 107 million.56
In Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, the claimant sued Hungary, first, because, in 
line with the Commission’s state aid decision, it terminated, through a legislative act, the 
PPAs with MVM and, second, because Hungary reintroduced price-regulation. As noted 
above, Hungary privatized its power plants in the ‘90s. The claimant purchased the majority 
of the shares of Dunamenti power plant and invested considerable funds into it for the 
purpose of retrofitting. Dunamenti had a PPA with MVM. Such contracts were common at 
that time and meant to back the privatization of the power plants: these facilities needed 
significant retrofitting and the long-term contracts were meant, in economic terms, to 
guarantee the investors that they would be able to sell the electricity they produce.
The expropriation claim raised two issues. First of all, the tribunal had to decide 
whether Hungary, in principle, could be held liable for terminating the PPAs taking into 
account that it had an obligation, emerging from EU law, to do so. It could have been 
argued that since EU law has supremacy over Member State laws, it was not Hungary’s 
decision to terminate the contracts. On the other hand, it could have been also plausibly 
argued that both conflicting duties (expropriation with just compensation and prohibition of 
anti-competitive state aid) had been freely assumed by Hungary and it should have been 
aware of its obligations under the ECT when joining the EU and Hungary should have 
requested a derogation. Second, it was questionable whether the termination of the PPA 
could be regarded as expropriation (in a wider sense) at all. The claimant was certainly 
deprived of its right to sell the power at a relatively high price as guaranteed in the contract. 
54 ICSID Case No. Arb/07/19.
55 The award was rendered on December 4, 2014. The tribunal consisted of Karl-Heinz 
Böckstiegel (chair), Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Albert Jan van der Berg.
56 http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/33251/edf-wins-claim-against-hungary/ 
accessed 20 October 2017.
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If this right is regarded as an investment, the occurrence of expropriation is out of question. 
However, if the investment is described as a bundle of rights, this also implies that the 
nullification of one element does not necessarily mean that the claimant’s investment was 
deprived of its value.
The tribunal grasped the relationship between the ECT and EU law on an abstract 
level. The tribunal did not succeed in cutting (or rather did not have to cut) the Gordian 
knot entailed by the sui generis nature of EU law. On the one hand, the tribunal established 
that there is no reason to treat EU law differently from ‘ordinary’ international law: ‘there is 
no fundamental difference in nature between international law and EU law that could justify 
treating EU law, unlike other international rules, differently in an international arbitration 
requiring the application of relevant rules and principles of international law’.57 On the 
other hand, the tribunal established that EU law is to be treated as national law: ‘when it is 
not applied as international rules under the ECT, EU law must in any event be considered as 
part of the Respondent’s national legal order, i.e. to be treated as a ‘fact’ before this 
international tribunal’.58
As to the relationship between the ECT and EU law, though the tribunal disagreed 
with the proposition that ‘there is a general principle of international law compelling the 
harmonious interpretation of different treaties’,59 it established that the relationship between 
the ECT and EU law is somewhat special, hence ‘the ECT should be interpreted, if possible, 
in harmony with EU law’.60 First, the EU and its Member States were closely involved 
in the adoption of the ECT and since according to Article 207(3) TFEU ‘(t)he Council and 
the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the agreements negotiated are 
compatible with internal Union policies and rules’,61 it can be assumed that the EU did not 
envisage entering into obligations that run counter to EU law; ‘the ECT’s conclusion by the 
EU and its Member States at that time (…) should be presumed, in the absence of clear 
language or cogent evidence otherwise, to have been made in conformity with EU law’.62 
Second, the ECT and the EU have similar objectives: the ECT ‘is an instrument clearly 
intended to combat anti-competitive conduct, which is the same objective as the European 
Union’s objective in combating unlawful State aid’.63 Third, the tribunal also established64 
that the ECT implicitly recognized that Commission decisions are binding on all Member 
States.65
The tribunal came to the conclusion that ‘there can be no practical contradiction 
between the ECT and EU law in regard to the Final Decision’ – ‘the ECT does not protect 
57 Award of the Tribunal (25 November 2015), para 4.126.
58 Para 4.127.
59 Para 4.130.
60 Para 4.130.
61 Para 4.135–36.
62 Para 4.134. In this regard, the tribunal referred to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, which provides that the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion may be used as a 
supplementary means of interpretation.
63 Para 4.133. See also paras 4.137. & 4.141.
64 Para 4.142.
65 See Article 1(3) ECT: ‘A “Regional Economic Integration Organization” means an 
organization constituted by states to which they have transferred competence over certain matters a 
number of which are governed by this Treaty, including the authority to take decisions binding on 
them in respect of those matters.’
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the Claimant, as against the Respondent, from the enforcement by the Respondent of a 
binding decision of the European Commission under EU law’.66 However, the supremacy 
of EU law provides immunity only to the Member State, which acts under the authority of 
the Commission (state aid) decision,67 the EU is not shielded from liability under the ECT. 
‘This analysis leaves open the responsibility of the European Union under the ECT for 
decisions of the European Commission which violate the rights of investors under the 
ECT.’68 In this sense the decision suggests that the claimant sued the wrong defendant.
Nonetheless, the tribunal also established that the immunity Hungary enjoys as a result 
of the Commission’s state aid decision ranges only to the point where it has no autonomy of 
action. Once a particular detail is left to the discretion of the Member State or is not 
mandated by the Commission decision, that Member State’s individual liability emerges 
and the tribunal will scrutinize this under the applicable standards.
6.72 Where Hungary is required to act in compliance with a legally binding decision 
of an EU institution, recognized as such under the ECT, it cannot (by itself) entail 
international responsibility for Hungary. Under international law, Hungary can be 
responsible only for its own wrongful acts. The Tribunal considers that it would be 
absurd if Hungary could be liable under the ECT for doing precisely that which it was 
ordered to do by a supranational authority whose decisions the ECT itself recognises 
as legally binding on Hungary.
(…)
6.76 For these reasons, the Tribunal decides that if and to the extent that the European 
Commission’s Final Decision required Hungary, under EU law, prematurely to 
terminate Dunamenti’s PPA, that act by the Commission cannot give rise to liability 
for Hungary under the ECT’s FET standard. The Tribunal next considers what the 
Final Decision did require of Hungary under EU law.
Hungary created a scheme for establishing the net stranded costs and for compensating 
the power plants for these (in case these had not been recovered). The tribunal found that 
Hungary’s own acts were in line with the applicable standards; however, since the last stage 
of this scheme was to be carried out at the time of the award, the tribunal reserved the right 
to decide on this in another award.69
It is to be noted that should the tribunal have decided otherwise, that would have 
entailed a vicious circle. As the Commission made it clear in its submissions: in the same 
way as the PPAs contained a veiled state aid, any money paid in exchange for (that is, 
substituting) this ‘right to sell’ must equally qualify as a state aid; in other words, if 
66 Para 4.169.
67 4.191. In summary, from whatever perspective the relationship between the ECT and EU law 
is examined, the Tribunal concludes that EU law would prevail over the ECT in case of any material 
inconsistency. That conclusion depends, however, upon the existence of a material inconsistency; and 
the Tribunal has concluded that none exists for the purpose of deciding the Parties’ dispute in this 
arbitration.
4.196. As regards the Parties’ arbitration agreement and the merits of their dispute, the Tribunal 
concludes that there is in this case no material inconsistency between the ECT and EU law.
68 Para 4.170.
69 Paras 6.108–09 & 6.118.
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compensation were awarded and paid, the Commission would have no choice but to enjoin 
Hungary to recover this from the claimant.
4.110. According to the European Commission, the pre-eminence of EU law has 
important consequences for the implementation of any award which contradicts EU 
law on State aid. According to the Commission, an award that substituted compensation 
for State aid unlawful under EU law would not be enforceable because it would be 
equivalent to a judgment of a national court of an EU Member State made in 
contradiction with EU law:
‘EU Member States are obliged under EC law to carry out Commission State aid 
decisions. If the Tribunal rendered an award that is contrary to obligations binding on 
Hungary as an EU Member State, such award could not be implemented in Hungary 
by virtue of the supremacy of EC law’.
As to expropriation, the tribunal grasped the claimant’s investment as its interests in 
Dunamenti; that is, it conceived the investment in wider sense and did not regard the right 
to sell electricity (the PPA) as an investment. As a consequence of this, the claimant should 
have demonstrated that the termination of the PPA deprived its interests in Dunamenti 
power plant of their value.
6.53 As regards indirect expropriation, the Tribunal considers that the wording of 
Article 13(1) ECT requires Electrabel to establish that the effect of the PPA’s 
termination by Hungary was materially the same as if its investment in Dunamenti had 
been nationalised or directly expropriated by Hungary. In other words, Electrabel must 
prove, on the facts of this case, that its investment lost all significant economic value 
with the PPA’s early termination. (…) In terminating the PPA by legislation, the 
Tribunal notes that Hungary has not deprived Dunamenti of the use of its power plant, 
equipment or other real property; and Dunamenti’s business, taken as a whole, was not 
rendered financially worthless by the PPA’s early termination but has continued 
thereafter as an economic concern competing in Hungary’s electricity market, with its 
plant still operational and operated by Dunamenti.
(…)
6.57 (…) If it were possible so easily to parse an investment into several constituent 
parts each forming a separate investment (as Electrabel here contends), it would render 
meaningless that tribunal’s approach to indirect expropriation based on ‘radical 
deprivation’ and ‘deprivation of any real substance’ as being similar in effect to a direct 
expropriation or nationalisation. It would also mean, absurdly, that an investor could 
always meet the test for indirect expropriation by slicing its investment as finely as the 
particular circumstances required, without that investment as a whole ever meeting 
that same test. (…)
6.58 In this Tribunal’s view, it is clear that both in applying the wording of Article 
13(1) ECT and under international law, the test for expropriation is applied to the 
relevant investment as a whole, even if different parts may separately qualify as 
investments for jurisdictional purposes. Here the investment held by Electrabel as a 
whole was its aggregate collection of interests in Dunamenti; it was thus one integral 
investment; and in the context of expropriation it was not a series of separate, 
individual investments with Dunamenti’s PPA as an autonomous investment set apart 
from Electrabel’s other interests in Dunamenti. In the Tribunal’s view, Electrabel’s 
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investment was manifestly not confined to the PPA; and the PPA formed an intrinsic 
and inseparable part of Electrabel’s investment as a whole.
The claimant also claimed that Hungary’s introduction of price regulation went counter 
to the requirement of fair and equitable treatment. The tribunal considered that the claimant 
could have no legitimate expectation that Hungary would not introduce regulated prices,70 
simply because ‘Electrabel’s investment was made on the basis of regulated pricing’;71 so 
the relevant question was not whether Hungary was entitled to reintroduce regulated prices 
but ‘whether in so doing, Hungary acted reasonably, in good faith and without improper 
motives towards Dunamenti in compliance with Article 10(1) ECT’.72
The tribunal rejected the claimant’s allegations that the introduction of price regulation 
was backed by populist politics – according to the tribunal political rhetoric is part of the 
democratic process and does not overshadow rational policy considerations.
8.23 There is no doubt that by late 2005 and early 2006 there was political and public 
controversy in Hungary over the perceived high level of profits made by Hungarian 
Generators, including Dunamenti. However, politics is what democratic governments 
necessarily address; and it is not, ipso facto, evidence of irrational or arbitrary conduct 
for a government to take into account political or even populist controversies in a 
democracy subject to the rule of law. Moreover, the Hungarian Government did not 
itself resort to populist language directed at Dunamenti. In brief, the Tribunal considers 
that Electrabel’s criticism of Hungary’s political motives is factually mistaken, 
particularly in alleging that Hungary’s conduct towards the Generators (especially Du-
namenti) was induced solely by malign populist pressures, now falsely camouflaged 
with other ostensibly more rational factors for the purpose of Hungary’s defence in 
these arbitration proceedings.
Hungary’s concerns that the price embedded in the PPAs could fall foul of EU state aid 
law were susceptible of legitimizing the introduction of price regulation, albeit at the 
relevant time the Commission had adopted no decision on this.
8.26 In the Tribunal’s view, it was therefore not irrational for Hungary temporarily to 
take into account this standstill obligation in promulgating the regulatory measures (by 
operation of law) of which Electrabel now complains. The Tribunal acknowledges 
that, at this particular time, Hungary could not foresee the actual result of the Europe-
an Commission’s investigations (almost two years’ later). Hungary’s conduct was 
prudent; and in the circumstances, it was certainly not rendered irrational by the 
Commission’s Final Decision. It is also significant that the European Commission’s 
Submission confirms that Hungary’s price regulation was made to bring its energy 
sector into line with the requirements of EU law, in particular EU law on State aid 
(paragraph 17).
8.27 For the purpose of price regulation by operation of law, the Tribunal therefore 
accepts that, at this time, it was not unreasonable for Hungary to understand (as in fact 
70 Para 8.18.
71 Para 8.19.
72 Para 8.22.
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it did) and to act upon the European Commission’s communications as a warning that 
Hungary should seek to discontinue unlawful State aid received by Generators under 
the PPAs, including Dunamenti.’
Interestingly, this argument is not reconcilable with the award in AES Summit 
Generation Limited, AES-Tisza Erőmű Kft. v. Hungary,73 where the tribunal found the fear 
from the European Commission’s procedure and the risk of illegal state aid did not qualify 
as a legitimate public interest in the eyes of the tribunal, noting that ‘as long as the 
Commission’s state aid decision was not issued, Hungary had no legal obligation to act in 
accordance with what it believed could be the result of the decision and to start a limitation 
of potential state aid’.74
7. CIVIL-LAW CONTROVERSY AND INVESTMENT DISPUTE
In Vigotop Limited v Hungary,75 the claimant envisaged constructing a casino (King City) 
and for this purpose concluded a concession agreement with Hungary. The annex of that 
agreement listed numerous locations and provided that the casino had to be constructed on 
any of those. Before the publication of the call for tenders for the conclusion of a concession 
agreement (which occurred on 10 February 2009),76 the claimant concluded a land swap 
agreement (on 30 July 2008) to acquire title over a plot near the city of Sukoró (one of the 
plots listed in the tender). On 14 August 2009, KC Bidding (a project company owned by 
the claimant) was announced as the winner of the tender77 and on 9 October 2009 the 
concession agreement was signed. However, two hours after the conclusion of the 
concession agreement, the Hungarian Ministry of Finance issued a press release stating that 
negotiations would be started as to the Sukoró land swap ‘with the aim of restoration of the 
original – pre-land-swap condition’.78 At the end of the day, the Hungarian court established 
that the acquisition of the Sukoró site was illegal and ordered the restoration of the initial 
status.
Under Hungarian law, state-owned arable land can be alienated only through a public 
tender; however, this requirement does not apply if the State wishes to acquire a land ‘for 
the purposes of public utility infrastructure projects or for some other reason of public 
interest’; in this case a land swap is permitted. The investor, Mr. Blum, the owner the 
claimant entities, in order to secure a proper site for the casino for the purposes of the 
concession agreement, wanted to acquire the Sukoró site. He had three plots in a nearby 
city, Albertirsa. It was established that the by-pass section of motorway ‘M4’ (which was 
under construction at that time) touched two of these real estates. The MNV (Hungarian 
National Asset Management Company) concluded a land swap contract with Mr. Blum, 
where the latter transferred title over these three real estates and paid a certain amount of 
money to the MNV, while the MNV transferred title over the Sukoró plot. However, the 
Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria) pronounced, in November 2012, the land swap agreement 
as null and void, finding that it had violated Section 13(4) of Act CXVI of 2001 on National 
73 ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22.
74 Para 10.3.16.
75 ICSID Case No. ARB/11/22.
76 Award (1 October 2014), para 123.
77 Para 127.
78 Para 154.
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Land Fund: it was not justified neither by ‘the purposes of public utility infrastructure 
projects’ nor by ‘some other reason of public interest’. The future construction of motorway 
M4 concerned only two of the three plots, and even as to the latter, the effect of the 
motorway was minimal.79
Although the claimant could have chosen any of the plots listed in the concession 
agreement’s annex (which listed 133 locations),80 it insisted on constructing the casino on 
the Sukoró site. Since the concessionaire failed to secure a plot in one of the 133 locations 
listed in the concession agreement’s annex, the Hungarian state terminated the concession 
agreement and demanded payment of the penalty stipulated. The legal dispute concerning 
the termination was pending at the time of the ICSID proceeding.
The pivotal legal question of the case was whether Hungary’s termination of the 
concession agreement qualified as a state measure or could not be regarded as an 
expropriatory act by its nature; notably, Hungary’s termination of the concession agreement 
was a private act (acta jure gestionis) and arguably the legal dispute between the parties did 
not qualify as a controversy between an investor and a sovereign but as a purely contractual 
dispute.
312. The Tribunal observes that the analysis whether certain conduct constitutes an 
expropriatory act cannot be carried out in an abstract manner, but rather must be based 
on the specific facts of the case. It has to be noted that the Concession Contract was 
not terminated by way of legislative act or executive decree, but rather by Respondent’s 
exercise of negotiated contractual termination rights, on the grounds that Claimant 
allegedly failed to comply with its contractual obligations. In the Termination Letter, 
Respondent did not purport to invoke any of its sovereign prerogatives. On its face, 
Respondent’s termination notice would therefore appear to be the act of an ordinary 
contracting party rather than the act of a sovereign State.
The tribunal defined the purview of ‘expropriatory act’ widely and went into the 
intricacies of the commercial dispute, establishing the following three-prong test. First, it 
has to be analyzed whether Hungary had public policy reasons to terminate the concession 
agreement – or the decision to terminate the agreement was based on purely contractual 
considerations. Second, in case of public policy reasons, it has to be ascertained whether the 
termination has a contractual ground. Third, in case of a contractual ground, it has to be 
examined whether the termination was legitimate, that is, whether Hungary acted in good 
faith.
328. The Tribunal will therefore begin its analysis by focusing on the key question: 
whether – to put it in the words of Prof. Schrijver – Respondent “stepped out of the 
contractual shoes” and, in fact, acted in its sovereign capacity when it terminated the 
Concession Contract. Accordingly, the Tribunal will first examine whether, as alleged 
by Claimant, Respondent had “a hidden political agenda”, which was the true reason 
for its termination of the Concession Contract, meaning that Respondent in fact took 
this decision in order to give effect to a change in government policy, and thus in its 
sovereign capacity. If this were not the case, this would exclude the finding of an 
79 Para 198.
80 Para 145.
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expropriation regardless of whether Respondent acted in accordance with the terms of 
the Concession Contract and Hungarian law. However, even if the Tribunal were to 
conclude that Respondent indeed had public policy reasons to terminate the Concession 
Contract, this would not necessarily in itself lead to a finding that the termination 
amounted to an expropriation because Respondent could at the same time have had 
contractual grounds for terminating the Concession Contract.
329. In the latter case, the Tribunal would therefore have to continue its analysis by 
examining, as a second step, whether contractual grounds for terminating the 
Concession Contract in fact existed. In the Tribunal’s view, a finding that none of the 
contractual grounds invoked by Respondent were sufficiently well-founded, while not 
being dispositive of the expropriation question in itself, could indicate that they were 
merely a pretext designed to conceal a purely expropriatory measure. If, on the other 
hand, the Tribunal were to reach the contrary conclusion, i.e., that Respondent had 
contractual termination grounds in addition to its public policy reasons, this would 
require a further analysis.
330. In the event of such a parallel cause (public policy reasons and contractual 
grounds), the Tribunal would thus have to examine, as a third and final step, whether 
the contractual termination was legitimate, i.e., consistent with the good faith principle. 
To be specific, the Tribunal would have to determine whether the termination 
constituted an abuse of the contractual right in order to avoid liability to compensate, 
that is, whether it involved a “fictitious” or “malicious” exercise of the right to 
terminate.
331. If the Tribunal were ultimately to conclude that it was indeed legitimate for 
Respondent to invoke its contractual grounds for terminating the Concession Contract, 
this would exclude a finding of an expropriation, despite the parallel existence of 
public policy reasons. The issues for determining an expropriation in the context of a 
contract termination are (i) whether the contract is terminated by the contractual 
procedure rather than a legislative act or executive decree, and (ii) whether there exists 
a legitimate contractual basis for termination, i.e., (a) the contract or the governing law 
provides the ground for termination, (b) the evidence substantiates a factual basis for 
invoking the contractual ground, and (c) the State acts in good faith, not abusing its 
right by a fictitious or malicious exercise of it.
In sum, the tribunal held that the termination of the concession agreement had to be 
examined, independent of any national court decision, since it was, in part, based on public 
policy reasons (new environmental and touristic public policies new environmental and 
touristic public policies); furthermore, ‘concerns about corruption in the land swap, although 
such concerns ultimately proved unfounded, may also have played a role in the 
Government’s decision to terminate the Concession Contract’. However, Hungary had a 
solid contractual ground to terminate the concession agreement and exercised its right in 
good faith: the claimant failed to secure a suitable plot for the purpose of the concession 
agreement. ‘[T]he Government included in the Contract a list of potential sites (still 
including Sukoró as one of them) at which the Project could be located. Claimant thus had 
ample options but failed to secure any site other than Sukoró, thereby assuming the risk that 
it would not have a valid title’.81
81 Para 634.
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8. INVESTMENT CLAIMS EMERGING FROM A JUDICIAL ERROR
The recent decision in Dan Cake (Portugal) S.A. v. Hungary82 is one of the very rare cases 
where a state was condemned for a judicial error. The Hungarian bankruptcy court opened a 
bankruptcy proceeding against the claimant’s subsidiary in Hungary (Danesita). With the 
help of its parent company, Danesita reached agreements with various creditors and 
requested the Hungarian court to convene a ‘composition hearing’ with the aim of entering 
into a compromise with the creditors. However, the court rejected the request for a hearing 
and, instead, ordered Danesita to satisfy numerous conditions; ‘it [also] insisted that the 
liquidator was obliged to proceed with the sale of its assets within 120 days from the 
publication of the liquidation proceedings’.83 Shortly thereafter, the auction sale of 
Danesita’s factory was announced by the liquidator.
The tribunal established that the rejection to convene a hearing amounted to the 
‘flagrant violation’ of Hungarian law;84 and although ‘[i]t is impossible (…) to determine 
whether a composition agreement would have been reached if a composition hearing had 
been convened’, this deprived the claimant of the fair and equitable treatment (in the form 
of denial of justice):85 As the tribunal found: ‘one thing is certain: whatever was the chance 
of a successful composition hearing, it was destroyed by the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to 
refuse to convene a hearing within 60 days, as required by the law’.86
The Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability was rendered on 24 August 2015. The case 
is still pending as to the quantum of damages.
9. CLOSING WORDS
The Hungarian experiences with (ICSID) investor-state arbitration have been rather diverse, 
ranging from unlawful expropriation to judicial errors. The bulk of the Hungarian cases 
have not centered around expropriation but ‘treatment’ claims (such as fair and equitable 
treatment): price regulation, public tenders (frequencies), contractual disputes related to 
concession agreement and improper application of national law by the national judiciary. 
Even though tribunals appeared to be highly deferential and Hungary won the vast majority 
of the disputes, these cases show the far-reaching and ever-widening sphere of operation of 
international investment arbitration.
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